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Abstract  
Practice-based perspectives in information systems have established how, in every 
instance of use (i.e., work practices), the user exercises considerable discretion in 
their appropriation of the technology with local workarounds and situated 
improvisations. We analyse the relationship between technologically mediated work 
practices separated in time and space. Specifically, we analyse how similarity in work 
practices is achieved. Achieving absolutely similar (or ‘best’) practices is 
unattainable. Drawing on a longitudinal (2007 – 2011) case of ambulatory 
maintenance work in the oil and gas sector, we identify and discuss three constituting 
strategies (differentiation, assembling and punctuation) through which a family 
resemblance of – similar but not the same – work practices is crafted. We discuss 
how, in the absence of an essentialist criterion, similarity is subject to pragmatic but 
also political negotiations. 
Keywords: Practice-based perspectives, mediating role of technology, work practices, 
standardisation 
1. Introduction  
Users exercise considerable discretion when appropriating technology. Empirical 
studies have consistently and convincingly demonstrated how information systems 
routinely, arguably even necessarily, are subject to workarounds, improvisations and 
tinkering (Gasser, 1986). That every instance of users’ interaction with technology is 
enacted (Orlikowski, 2000), situated (Suchman, 2007), a bricolage (Orr 1996), 
improvised (Orlikowski, 1996) and contextual (Robey & Sahay, 1996) is well 
rehearsed in information systems research. 
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There is, however, a relative scarcity of accounts of the relationship between 
time-space separated instances of user’s interactions (i.e. work practices). In 
particular, we lack a robust understanding of how the ‘same’ work practices emerge 
over time and space (Leonardi & Barley 2008). In an increasingly globalised world, 
establishing uniform work practices is vital for competitiveness of business 
organisations (Leidner 1993). The group of engineers engaged in the maintenance of 
oil and gas wells we study is under mounting pressure for reasons of economy of 
scale as well as health, environment and safety improvements to establish more 
uniform work processes across the many wells they serve.  
Quite a few, in line with Garfinkel’s (1967) advice, have addressed the time 
dimension of this relationship: work practices are analysed through processes of 
learning (Hyysalo 2009; Chu & Robey, 2008), organisational routines (Feldman and 
Pentland 2003) or imitation/ isomorphism (Batenburg et al. 2008). Fewer studies, 
notably of Enterprise Systems, also exist that focus on the space dimension and how 
technology mediates (or rather not) the ‘same’ (‘best’) practices across distributed 
sites (Wagner and Newell 2004; Volkoff et al. 2005; Wagner, Scott, & Galliers, 
2006). The purpose of this paper is to contribute towards a theoretical understanding 
of how ‘same’ technologically mediated work practices emerge by tracing out the 
space and time dimensions. We make two contributions. 
First, we give a characterisation of how the ‘same’ technologically mediated, 
space-separated work practices emerge over time. As “[t]he vector of time has long 
been recognised” while “[t]he vector of space, in contrast, has remained 
comparatively undertheorized” (Amin and Cohendet 2004, p. 86), our analysis starts 
from technological mediation across space working as a template or plan that over 
time gets refined, backed up – or defeated. We identify and discuss constituting 
strategies of (i) differentiation (“what is the unique personality of this oil well?”), (ii) 
assembling similarities (“how to make simplifications?”) and (iii) punctuation (“what 
happens when simplifications break down?”).  
Second, we discuss how similar technologically mediated work practices need 
to be to be the ‘same’. Time-space separated work practices clearly cannot literally be 
the same. We understand ‘similar’ not as ‘same’ (i.e. identical) but as ‘family 
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resemblance1’ (i.e. degree of sameness). The question thus becomes for whom, where 
and when are work practices similar enough? Family resemblance among work 
practices is in our analysis not an essentialist quest for certain attributes but rather a 
performed achievement. We discuss how similar enough is relative to a given purpose 
framed within political and institutional discourses.  
2. Theory: Practice-based perspectives and beyond 
2.1. The local 
Practice-based perspectives2 in information systems do not represent a well-defined 
body of literature but comprise a loosely connected set of theoretical and 
methodological approaches (Schatzki et al. 2001; Nicolini 2011). It has been robustly 
established that technology but create the conditions for – not govern – human 
encounters with technology (Avgerou and Ciborra, 2004; Boudreau and Robey, 2005; 
Newell and Wagner, 2006; Orlikowski, 1996, 2000; Robey and Boudreau, 1999). A 
distinguishing feature of practice-based perspectives is their emphasis on users’ 
interactions with technology (i.e. work practices) as local (alternatively: situated, 
contextual, improvised or enacted). The exact formulation of the affinity with the 
local varies with the theoretical underpinning. Suchman (2007, p. 70), leaning on a 
combination of ethnomethodology and science studies, points out that work practice 
is not predetermined by formal specifications, but instead is contingent and “depends 
in essential ways on its material and social circumstances”. Similarly, from a 
structuration theory basis, Orlikowski (2000, p.412) underscores the situated, 
contextual and local nature of a user’s interaction as “every encounter with 
technology is temporally and contextually provisional, and thus there is, in every use, 
always the possibility of a different structure being enacted”. 
                                                1The%notion%of% family% resemblance%was%made% famous%by%Wittgenstein% (1953)% in%his%discussion%about%how%we%learn%the%rules%of%(language)%games.%There%cannot%be%exhaustive%rules%telling%you%when%to%employ%a%rule%due%to%the%problem%of%infinite%regress.%Hence%you%learn%to%recognise%when%similar%(i.e.%family%resemblance)%conditions%for%rules%apply.%2% We% use% the% term% broadly% to% cover% information% systems% research% where% the% contextual%conditions% for%work%practices% are%highlighted,% e.g.%with%notions% such% as% appropriation,% practice%lens,% improvisation,% technologyEinEpractice%and%enactment%(see%e.g.%Leonardi%and%Barley%(2010)%for%an%extensive%review).%
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Underscoring of the local in practice-based research has entailed an emphasis 
on tracing out local contingencies at play in information systems implementation 
processes (Leonardi & Barley, 2010). For example, Robey and Sahay (1996) 
conducted a comparative case study of a geographical information system (GIS) 
implementation within two government organisations and identified  “radically 
different experiences with, and consequences of, the GIS technology” (ibid., 93). The 
difference in outcomes of implementation of the same technology was attributed to 
differences in the local contexts of the two organisations, e.g. the differences in user 
involvement, management commitment and technological experience.  
Another connotation of the local in practice-based perspectives is the 
malleable character of the technology. From the field of science studies, technology 
allows ‘interpretive flexibility’, implying that “for different social groups, the artefact 
presents itself as essentially different artefacts” (Bijker, 1992, p.76). Exploring the 
malleability of technology has been important also in practice-based perspectives in 
information systems. What practice-based perspectives accomplish well, then, is 
documenting the inherent space for users’ workarounds; there is always leeway for 
human discretion in encounters with technology (Gasser 1986). The ‘agentic turn’ 
(Emirbayer and Mische 1998), which is also influential in practice-based research 
(Boudreau and Robey 2005), risks privileging individual over collective action, 
thereby undermining how practice theory originally was geared towards collective 
practices (Schatzki et al,. 2001; Bourdieu 1977). It is not that practice-based 
perspectives rule out limitations to local discretion as e.g. Orlikowski (2000, p. 409) 
writes, “[s]aying that use is situated and not confined to predefined options does not 
mean that is totally open to any and all possibilities”. For instance, Boudreau and 
Robey (2005) explicitly set out to test whether there is room for human discretion in 
the case of integrated systems and conclude that their results strengthen the practice-
based position by “showing that such enactment apply [also] to an ostensibly less 
flexible technology, an ERP system” (ibid., p. 14). 
The meaning of the ‘local’ in practice-based research has always been a 
source of misunderstanding. As Nicolini (2011, p. 603) points out, “the practice-based 
approach is always exposed to the risk of being understood as a call for more close-up 
micro-studies”. The risk, in other words, is that the local is understood too literally as 
a space-time confined physical location. An overly literal meaning of ‘local’ would 
run counter to a fuller understanding of practice-based perspectives (see e.g. Schatzki 
  5 
et al. 2001; Gherardi 2000). In sum, that users’ work practices are local/ situated is 
thus broadly accepted, but exactly what a local situation is – how it extends in space 
and time, how it is mediated by technology – remains contested. 
2.2. Non-local: enter space and time  
Work practices are local in the sense of being shaped by local social, historical and 
material circumstances but not local in the sense of being confined in time-space to a 
particular locale. Conflating the latter with the former creates seemingly 
‘contradictions’ (Pollock et al. 2009, p. 255), ‘puzzles’ (Yamauchi and Swanson 
2010, p. 188) or as Shapin (1995, p. 307) early put it in the context of the ‘artefact’ of 
a scientific fact: “If, as empirical research securely establishes, science is a local 
product, how does it travel with what seems to be unique efficiency?”. How to resolve 
this contradiction is the subject of ongoing debates in and around information systems 
research as we outline in discussing three particularly relevant approaches. 
One approach is based on insights about standardised (i.e. similar) work 
practices within science studies. The key is to embed the local into the very notion of 
standardised practice. For instance, Timmermans and Berg (1997) studied the use of 
clinical protocols (practices). While the primary aim of the protocols is to transform 
and standardise work practices, the authors vividly illustrate that the protocols are not 
universal. Actors perform minor and not-so-minor deviations in order to adjust a 
given protocol to unforeseen situations. Local tinkering with the protocol, the authors 
argue, is not a failing of but a prerequisite for the working of the protocol. Local 
tinkering is inherent as captured by their notion of ‘local universalism’. As Berg and 
Timmermans (2000, p. 45) argue, the local tinkering is inherently implied or 
embedded as the effort itself of standardisation “produce the very disorder [local 
tinkering] they attempt to eradicate”. 
Within information systems research, Vaast and Walsham (2009) are among 
the few scholars who have tried to draw on the notion of local universalism (see also 
Monteiro and Rolland 2012). Vaast and Walsham (2009) studied distributed 
communities of practice in the field of Environmental Health. The authors 
emphasised the role of technology, and coined the term ‘trans-situated learning’ to 
explain how people can communicate and exchange experience with the help of 
technology, yet do not share an actual context of work (i.e. separated by a 
geographical boundary). Pollock et al.’s (2007) notion of ‘generification’ may like 
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local universalism be understood as an attempt to embed the local within the 
definition of the universal. They are helpful in dismantling local/global dichotomies, 
but offer less in terms of detailing the process of crafting local universalism, which 
brings us to the next approach. 
A second approach to resolving the above contradiction is that of re-working 
the definition/ concept of a ‘situation’. Explicitly drawing on, but going beyond Orr’s 
(1996) classic study of repair work of photocopiers, scholars have focused on work 
practices less reliant on “[t]erritorial boundaries provid[ing] a reference for all action” 
(Orr 1996, p. 64; also quoted in Pollock et al. 2009, p. 256). From an Activity theory 
basis, Nicolini (2007) proposes the notion of ‘stretching out’ the situation in time and 
space. Central to his analysis is the material mediation of work practices. He 
concludes that this mediation “implies much more than simple redistribution of 
existing work” (ibid., p. 914). Driven by related instincts, Pollock et al. (2009) 
suggest the notion of an ‘extended situation’. Focusing on remote problem solving at 
a help desk of an international software vendor, they analyse how, where and when 
selected problems were mediated or transformed. The focus in their analysis is to 
demonstrate the many links to resources, people and routines that make problem 
solving non-local. 
Nicolini (2011) recently attempted to re-frame (the situation, now re-named 
into) the site. Dismissing the literal (i.e. physical, spatio-temporal) meaning of a site 
up front, he underscores the interconnected nature of practices spread in space and 
time. His Actor-network theory base leads him to focus on the performances that 
make practices similar, in much the same way as Turnbull (2000, p. 41) who points 
out that “[t]he answers [to the contradictions about ‘local’] lie in a variety of social 
strategies and technical devices that provide for treating instances of knowledge/ 
practice as similar or equivalent and for making connections, that is in enabling local 
knowledge/practices to move and to be assembled”.  
If similarities of practices are indeed crafted (performed) through 
sociomaterial strategies, this pushes us third and lastly to consider proposals for such 
strategies applicable to our empirical domain of oil and gas. Frodeman (1986) is an 
interesting case in point as he outlines strategies related to geology (see also Almklov 
Hepsø 2011). The geological understanding of one site is established by identifying, 
through a set of strategies, similarities with other sites.  
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Frodeman (1996: 418-419) describes a heuristic he calls ‘visual intelligence’ 
where a set of templates organise sets of marks into a body of significant signs. The 
tools used both aid geologists’ practice and are instrumental in codifying their 
observations. He indicates three strategies constituting visual intelligence: contrasts, 
patterns and aberrancies. First, contrasts signify boundaries, i.e. what is inside or 
outside? Contrasts are vital to classification but also to grasp the whole geological 
understanding and elements of the context. Second, in a search for patterns, geologists 
bring together a set of similarities and differences that imply order.  Crafting order 
through contrast and finding patterns implies repeatedly moving from the details to 
the whole (cf. hermeneutics). Third, during these movements in perspective and scale, 
the geologists keep a keen eye out for anomalies or aberrancies. Anomalies are 
significant for family resemblance because they deviate from the normal patterns and 
contrasts with an imposed order. They are clues that may challenge or support 
interpretation. However, anomalies only make sense as a part of a larger order of 
contrasts and patterns. They provide pragmatic testing of the robustness of an 
imposed order envisioned through contrasts and patterns. 
In what follows, we operationalise the abstractly formulated strategies of 
Frodeman (1986) to the work practices of oil and gas well maintenance engineers. We 
analyse the crafting – temporal and fragile – of similar enough work practices by 
tracing out the interconnections in space-time of extended situations inspired by 
Actor-network theory. 
3. Research methods 
3.1. Case setting, access and selection 
Established in the 1970s, the global oil and gas company (OGC, a pseudonym) has 
grown from a small, regional operator in Northern Europe to a significant energy 
company, currently employing some 30,000 people with activities in 40 countries 
across four continents and listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Historically, the 
units of OGC have been semi-autonomously organised by geography i.e. around the 
site of the oil field. The OGC has a long history of organising work according to 
hierarchical models and a strict division of labour. Currently, OGC may be classified 
as a matrix organisation with business units serving multiple functions. As result, oil 
and gas production from a given oil and gas field is dependent on a number of 
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different disciplines belonging to different functional units. In addition to internal 
matrix organising, the OGC is heavily dependent on multiple external vendors and 
service companies. 
Our study focuses on a designated group of engineers doing oil and gas well 
maintenance (or ‘intervention’). The well is drilled deep into the seabed and is largely 
inaccessible. Well intervention is critically important to mitigate risks to health, 
environment and commercial interests. Well interventions have traditionally differed 
significantly from oil field to oil field due to site-specific differences in the geological 
formations, layout of the production system and level and profile of competence of 
the offshore workers. As one engineer explained, “every well is unique”. 
The three authors of this paper have intimate but different knowledge of OGC 
(Hepsø et al. 2009; Østerlie et al. 2012). This paper draws predominantly on the 
empirical data collected by the second author who has been studied collaborative 
work practices in different organisational contexts in OGC since 2007-2011. The first 
author has conducted a series of interpretative studies of collaboration and 
infrastructure in OGC over a period of 15 years. The third author has worked almost 
20 years as a senior researcher at OGC. He has been involved in research projects 
about the operation and maintenance of subsea wells. This is relevant to understand 
the setting, including the historical context of the oil and gas industry in Northern 
Europe. The authors, especially the first and third, have an extended history of 
research collaboration. 
Motivated by cost-cutting through economy of scale, OGC has for some time 
attempted to streamline its core business processes, including well intervention, by 
working out extensive documentation on the sequence, actors involved and required 
deliverables during well interventions. These attempts of establishing uniform (i.e. 
similar) work practices have met with but modest success. In a renewed effort, OGC 
recently (in 2006) established a so-called lightweight well intervention (LWI) group 
of engineers that plan and supervise well interventions across large numbers of fields 
and wells. Establishing (more) similar work practices as LWI illustrates, is a 
notorious source of controversies and conflict within OGC. The motivation for more 
similar work practices is clearly cost-efficiency but also safety. Recently (January 
20123), several OGC unions have publicly argued that ‘excessive’ levels of 
                                                3%See%industry%magazine%Teknisk%Ukeblad,%www.tu.no%
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uniformity in key work practices would undermine safe operations. Our selection of 
LWI was theoretically sampled as an illustration of how tensions over uniform vs. 
localised work practices, beyond economic performance, are tied to risks to human 
life and the environment (Eisenhardt 1989). 
3.2. Data collection 
We draw on three types of data collection mainly conducted by the second author: 
semi-structured interviews, participatory observations and document studies. We have 
conducted in total 68 interviews (see Table 1 for an overview), each lasting 1-3 hours 
and predominately transcribed. The first round of interviews were open-ended and 
aimed at broadly identifying strategic IT visions, implementation activities related to 
collaborative systems and users’ perceptions of technology. Subsequent interviewing 
targeted specific infrastructural components, work practices and individual’s 
interactions with technology. The technological complexity and purpose of a 
collaborative infrastructure were discussed with developers, administrators and 
managers of the infrastructure. We conducted 14 interviews with members of this 
group. The 23 interviews with engineers and researchers in the R&D department 
explored technology-mediated, collaborative work in more detail.  The 22 interviews 
in the Oil and gas prodution (OGP) department focused more closely on key 
subsurface work practices including drilling, well maintenance, production 
optimisation and process performance. The 9 interviews at LWI highlighted the 
specificity of the ‘light’ well interactions. 
--- TABLE 1 about here - --- 
We conducted participant observations at several sites within OGC. The 
second author spent 2-3 days a week during 2008 at the R&D department. He was 
granted access to OGC’s internal computer network and intranet. In 2009, he spent 20 
full days of observation over 6 months at an OGC department at another site. This 
was particularly important to understand the highly technical professional language of 
the reservoir, production and well engineers comprising the core of the subsurface 
community. Participant observations were interleaved, as is common with our type of 
interpretative case studies, with informal interviews/ conversations over coffee or in 
the corridor to clarify issues, pose a question that could not be put during a meeting or 
get brief feedback on observations. The LWI group is located in the same building as 
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the OGP department making access smooth. 7 of the 20 days of observations at the 
OGP site were devoted to LWI. 
25 pages of field notes were taken during the observations. The field notes 
recorded, as accurately as practically feasible, selected episodes, exchanges and 
outbursts during everyday work. Alongside these ‘raw’ empirical data, we maintained 
notes about question-begging observations, early interpretations or issues we could 
not understand (which we needed to clarify with the informants later).  
We had access to an extensive collection of predominantly electronic but also 
paper-based documents. These were mainly internal OGC documents on strategies, 
plans, memos and experience reports related to the collaborative corporate 
infrastructure. In addition, we analysed the technical descriptions, formal 
presentations and training materials of various infrastructural components. A number 
of presentations, governing documents and formal process descriptions related to LWI 
activities were studied in detail. Finally, we have collected external reports from 
industry magazines and the media. 
3.3. Data analysis 
In our longitudinal study, data analysis was iterative and ongoing and overlapping 
with data collection (Boland 2005). The stages of data analysis are blurred but may, to 
keep the “inherent creative leap” involved in interpretative research of our kind as 
transparent as possible (Langley 1999, p. 691), structured into three stages. 
First, we produced a flow- or process-oriented understanding of the sequence, 
content and resources involved in the LWI: how it was requested, planned, conducted 
and evaluated. Documentary data was particularly useful here. OGC has an extensive, 
critics hold almost bureaucratic, set of ‘Governing documents’ that describe and 
regulate business processes including well maintenance. 
Second, we manually (using colours, annotations, post-it notes) coded 
transcripts, field notes and documentary data. Our unit of analysis was LWI practices 
and their relationship rather than actors (Nicolini 2011). Anything but clean slates 
(Suddaby 2006), coding was influenced by our deep knowledge of OGC as well as 
our theoretical affinity with practice- and process-oriented perspectives including 
Actor-network theory (References suppressed for anonymity). Coding was inductive 
but with important deductive impulses. Coding was in rounds and interleaved with 
clustering into conceptual categories (see Table 2). Early coding identified how and 
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where LWI worked around shortcomings of the procedures of the Governing 
documentation. For instance, complaining that the formal procedures were too crude, 
LWI engineers stressed the importance of the specific “history of the well” which 
subsequently aggregated into our conceptual category of ‘biography’ of the well. 
Partly driven by deductive influences, early coding did not identify when LWI 
engineers had enough details about the well to proceed. Rather than precise cut-off 
criteria, our later coding identified strategies employed that worked as heuristic 
approximations. For instance, we coded instances where LWI engineers relied on the 
advice of “more experienced” peers. This coding underscored the important of trust in 
professional networks and aggregated into one of our conceptual categories (cf. Trust 
in Table 2). Driven by a healthy scepticism to exhaustive planning and what Orr 
(1996, p. 110) refers to as the limited ‘prescriptive ability’ of formal documents, our 
last round of coding focused on breakdown situations i.e., when plans demonstrably 
are failing. For instance, instances when “the pressure caus[ed] the tubing to collapse” 
during LWI, despite plans assessing pressure limits, were coded as the conceptual 
category of unplanned events. 
Third, from the derived conceptual categories we developed our interpretative 
template in the form of three constructs (see first column of Table 2). Given our 
ambitions of characterising performative strategies for how LWI was accomplished, 
our constructs mirror our effort to condense the richer insights of the working 
vehicles, the conceptual categories. 
--- TABLE 2 about here ---- 
4. Case 
4.1. The well 
The well is the central object around which exploration, drilling, production, 
maintenance and process performance evolve. It is a deep, largely inaccessible and 
highly complex object. Wells vary in length (1000 – 5000 meters), direction 
(previously only vertical, now placed also horizontally), number of well connected to 
a facility (smaller ones 10-15 wells while larger fields have 70-100 production wells 
connected) and purpose (injection of gas and/or water to increase reservoir pressure). 
Wells are drilled to extract hydrocarbons from a reservoir to the platform where oil 
and gas are separated and later transported to onshore facilities by tankers or 
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pipelines. A reservoir contains water and sand in addition to hydrocarbons. Reservoirs 
differ in their location (depth, geological formation), consistency (porosity, 
permeability), characteristics (temperature and pressure) and size. Deep-sea and high 
pressure/temperature wells, of which OGC operate several, require special equipment 
to be installed to ensure flow assurance and prevent leakage as noted by Obama’s 
commission after the Deepwater Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mexico in 20104. 
The majority of OGC’s, wells are several decades old. Throughout their life-
cycle or biography5, data about the well is collected in a variety of formats (text, 
picture, histograms), degree of formalisation (from free-text to time-stamped 
instrument readings), technological platforms (the subsurface community has about 
numerous specialised information systems for storing, manipulating, analysing and 
visualising the data) and purpose (data collected during exploration focuses on 
minimizing drilling time whereas production is concerned with the location of the 
well within the reservoir).  
The traditional way since the 1970 to produce offshore wells has been from 
platforms floating or resting on the seabed. Such wells are called ‘topside’, as 
wellheads6 are installed on the platform. Motivated by a combination of lowered 
operational costs and strengthened abilities to operate in hostile7 (large depths, high 
pressure, cold climate) environments, global energy companies have been fiercely 
engaged in innovations allowing the production/ extraction of hydrocarbons from 
‘subsea’ wells8. In contrast to topside wells, subsea wells are completed on the 
seabed. The wellhead of a subsea well is installed on the sea floor and not on the 
platform (see Figure 1 for an illustration). The daily production from subsea wells is 
                                                4%See%www.oilspillcommission.gov/final-report%5% Recognising% the% long% timeEspans% of% technologies% by% using% the% analogy% of% a% ‘biography’% is%borrowed%from%Pollock%and%Williams%(2009).%6% A% wellhead% is% a% part% of% a% well,% which% terminates% at% the% surface% where% hydrocarbons% can% be%withdrawn.% The% wellhead% consists% of% multiple% devices% that% operate% the% well% and% ensure%production%control.%%7% ‘Easily’% accessible% oil% has% already% been% located.% The% remainder% is% increasingly% inaccessible,%involving%more% elaborate% and% complex% subsea% technologies.% An% estimated% 25%% of% the% world’s%remaining%oil%reserves%are%in%the%Arctic%with%severe%environmental%and%weather%challenges.%8%The%vision%of%both%oil%companies%and%vendors%is%to%have%complete%production%plants%subsea.%
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from remote (onshore or on neighbouring platforms) control centres based on the 
instrument readings from the subsea installation. 
---- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ---- 
OGC has strategically targeted subsea wells as the present and planned fields 
are difficult/ costly to run from top-side wells. Investing heavily since the 1980s, 
OCG is currently among the global pioneers of subsea wells. OGC operates around 
500 subsea wells. On the Norwegian Continental shelf, over 60% of OGC’s oil and 
gas production is currently from subsea wells. This percentage is expected to increase 
in as “there is a gradual transfer from installations projecting above the sea surface to 
subsea installations” (OGC intranet news, October 2009). The focus of this paper is 
on subsea wells and their maintenance. 
4.2. Well maintenance (or ‘intervention’)  
Subsea wells consist of multiple technological components such as sensors, valves, 
casing, tubing equipment and electronic control units (see Figure 2). These 
components are in themselves complex, technological devices obviously not 
infallible. The components of a subsea well are exposed to severe environmental 
stress. At different rates, they all decay e.g. from corrosion or sand production (see 
Figure 3 for illustration). An instant increase in sand production may damage sensor 
within hours or days. The purpose of well interventions is to maintain the technical 
integrity of the well to mitigate against health, environmental and/or commercial risks 
and increase production performance. Unplanned shutting down production due to 
lacking maintenance represent significant economic damage to OGC from lost 
revenues and large fixed costs (equipment, personnel).  
---- INSERT FIGURES 2 and 3 ABOUT HERE ---- 
Well interventions mainly repair or replace selected components of the subsea 
well. Wells can fill with sand and needs ‘washing’ by injecting chemicals into the 
well at designated pressure. Many of subsea well interventions are due to ‘scale’. 
Scale consists mainly of inorganic salts that have elements of calcium carbonates, 
barium and strontium sulphates. The production tubing gets clogged from scale that 
severely hampers the flow of hydrocarbons in the well. Scale typically develops when 
reservoir formation water (i.e. water contained inside the reservoir) enters the well. 
When the formation water undergoes changes in pressure and temperature, or where 
two incompatible fluids are intermingled, either sulphate or carbonate scales may 
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develop. Even relatively new subsea wells may suffer from scale if drilling or 
completion fluid is incompatible with the formation water. During production, as oil 
and gas are gradually drained, increased amounts of formation water are produced 
together with the hydrocarbons and is likely to give scale challenges.  
Well intervention also involves replacing or upgrading faulty or outdated 
components. Well temperature and pressure transmitters tend to have short life cycles. 
They are, however, expensive to replace when this entails shutting down the well. 
Instead, well intervention activities rely on specialised logging tools that do not 
assume a shut well. Logging tools may gather data to compensate for the loss of 
instrument measurements. Well logs are collections of different data types based on 
physical measurements performed by tools lowered into the subsea wells, normally in 
connection with drilling or well operations.  
Well interventions for topside and subsea wells require distinct intervention 
technologies. While topside wells are accessed from platforms, subsea well 
interventions are remotely conducted from mobile rigs or vessels. The first subsea 
well interventions were conducted from mobile rigs, but due to costs, OGC has 
increasingly used vessels. OGC performed its first light well intervention (LWI) in 
2000 and has been committed ever since to this technology due to its high cost saving 
potential: “deploying a special purpose intervention vessel rather than a rig for 
downhole operations in subsea wells cuts the costs of these jobs by roughly 50 
percent” (OGC intranet news, December 2004). While vessels offer significant cost 
reduction, they do not eliminate the need for mobile rigs as vessels only perform 
smaller interventions. If a well is damaged during an intervention, a mobile rig 
probably has to be employed. It is accordingly important to assess the scope (e.g. rig 
vs. vessel) of an intervention accurately to leverage the potential efficiency gains of 
LWI. 
4.3. Light well intervention (LWI) 
Light well intervention (LWI) originated from a UK based energy company. OGC 
operates a significant number of subsea wells and established a dedicated group to 
plan and supervise LWI. The LWI department of OGC was established in 2006. It is 
relatively small (about 30 people) and consists of well and subsea engineers, well 
planning managers, materials coordinator, health and safety engineers, an economist 
and a technical assistant who all work onshore and are co-located. In addition, 12 well 
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managers participate in onshore meetings, but primary work onboard offshore vessels. 
The core activities of LWIs are the planning and supervision of well interventions. 
Communication with the central control room at the neighbouring offshore platform 
that operate the subsea wells during production is vital. The processes of shutting 
down the well before and re-opening after LWI are safety-critical. While LWI is 
conducted in one well, normal operations may continue for the other wells belonging 
to the same field. 
LWIs are organised in campaigns. OGC is currently operating two vessels 
covering approximately 500 subsea wells. Interventions thus have to be planned well 
in advance. Any field within OGC may request the services of LWI. Typically, a 
production engineers from a given field submits a request based on his/ her 
assessment of the local situation. LWI operates a planning matrix outlining the 
number and location of interventions of the present year. Moreover, well interventions 
are planned in parallel. The local policy of an LWI is that when a vessel leaves the 
dock to perform an intervention, two additional interventions have to be planned. In 
case of unexpected situations, a vessel can perform another intervention:  
We [LWI] do not want vessels to be parked in the dock. The vessel that 
completes an intervention comes to dock, unloads the equipment, and new 
equipment is loaded and the vessel leaves to perform another intervention. 
This happens continually the whole year round… if the vessel is parked in 
the docks, we loose money… (LWI engineer)  
The key challenge for LWI is – drawing on relevant knowledge of involved actors, 
digging into available documentation about the well and its equipment, an 
understanding of the reservoir, consulting the production engineer triggering the LWI 
and the control room of the platform – to grasp the particular issues of the well in 
question and conduct a sufficiently safe planning and execution of the intervention. 
LWI is premised on the assumption it can be conducted without insight into the full-
fledged biography of the well. For LWI engineers the question is how, where and 
when simplifications in their work practices are made. 
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5. Analysis 
5.1. Differentiation: identifying the profile of the well 
As most safety-critical organisations, OGC has an extensive set of ‘Governing 
documents’ regulating its principal business processes such as exploration, drilling, 
project development, production,  – and well interventions. Governing documents lay 
out the structure of the process as well as required input to and format of output from 
these processes. One document template is the so-called ‘Well Intervention 
Assignment’ outlining the type of intervention planned together with production and 
reservoir information. During a ‘start-up’ meeting, the production engineers present 
the Well Intervention Assignment to the well engineers, thus initiating LWI.  
As is by now well-known, formal work descriptions and templates for LWI, to 
be applied for all wells uniformly, do not of course govern the work practices but 
rather act as resources, checklists or a point of departure. In the everyday practices of 
LWI, a primary strategy is to conjure from resources, including but not restricted to 
those in the templates, a ‘profile’ or differentiation of the special characteristics of the 
well in question. We illustrate. 
A central part of LWI’s effort to grasp the uniqueness of the well – its 
personality – is to re-construct historically the biography of the well. In stark contrast 
to topside well interventions, LWI have little prior, local knowledge of the well. On 
the rare occasions they do have prior experience with the well, “we believe the quality 
improves” as one LWI engineer stated.  Engineers with in-depth, historical 
understanding of the well conduct topside well interventions. This is exactly what 
LWI needs to re-create, if not in full, at least sufficiently for the intervention.  This re-
construction takes time: the planning of topside well interventions typically takes less 
than a week whereas LWI planning takes more than a month. 
There is truly an abundance of data constituting the full biography of the well. 
To illustrate, during the drilling phase alone, more than a thousand documents may be 
produced for a single well. For subsea wells, the target of LWI, there is in addition 
real-time data from instrument readings of pressure (see Figure 4), fluid flow rate, 
temperature, vibration, composition, fluid hold-up and electromagnetic resistance. 
One subsea well will typically have about 5-10 sensors. 
-- FIGURE 4 about here --- 
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So how and where to start? The LWI templates provide useful cues by requiring any 
intervention to include drawings (with coordinates) about the drilling of the well, 
details about subsea equipment installed, diameter of a well in different zones, 
description of well completion and experience reports. The so-called Final Well 
Report is a point of departure. Drilling engineers produce it during completion of the 
drilling project. It describes equipment used during drilling, experiences and 
challenges encountered. The historical reconstruction of the well, however, gets 
entangled with the fact that relevant information is distributed across three 
generations of IT9 platforms for electronic archiving: 
You have to dig into several archives [electronic and possibly paper-
based], which are usually not accessible by everyone. If it is an electronic 
archive, you need to get access to it, which can take a lot of time… So I 
have to find a person who has the authority to give access. Nobody has 
access to everything. (LWI engineer). 
Production engineers, regularly the ones requesting LWI, are less than helpful in the 
historical reconstruction. As one production engineer explains, “If you didn’t follow 
the well from its inception, there is no way you can know where to find the 
information or what kind of information that is available” and “there are no 
defaults…you have to ask people”. Compounding the challenge of locating relevant 
information about the well, naming conventions (for oil and gas fields, wells, 
documents and archiving structure) are historicised and site-specific: “The problem is 
that we have a complex tree-structure [of folders] and you have to have been working 
here for years in order to find something”. This literally situated (in history, site-
specific) quality of information organisation about the well and the lack of 
understanding that the well has a biography is the reason why search engines are of 
limited value. OGC has several times tried to use search engines, but never solved the 
problem, largely non-existent when we Google the net, of deeply historicized data.   
Another crucial aspect of differentiation or working out the personality of a 
well is the details of the complexity of the configuration of the technical components 
of the subsea well.  As one LWI engineer explains, “There is no plug & play 
possibilities [across vendors of subsea components]”, implying that also well work-
                                                9%These%platforms%are:% shared%disk%drives% in%a%Microsoft%based%network,%Lotus%Notes%databases%and%Sharepoint.%%
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over equipment used during LWI is proprietary for every vendor. Even compatibility 
across versions of components from the same vendor may be difficult. Knowing the 
exact configuration of components of the equipment, crucial for LWI, thus involves 
consulting closely with the network of external vendors and service providers 
involved in the well. Even though LWI supervises the interventions, domain experts 
from several companies involved: the vendor of subsea equipment, the pilots 
operating the remotely operated vehicles, marine vessel crew and representatives from 
vendors that did the original completion of the well. Frustrated by not being able to 
find accurate documentation about the subsea equipment, “I call [the external 
vendors] and inquire whether they have it. I’ve done this a couple of times and 
actually obtained the information” on LWI engineer explains.  OGC has recently 
(2012) started upgrading the control module of subsea wells for one oil field “quite 
uniquely…as they are mounted also to equipment from a competitor”10. 
Lacking (even important) information, however, does not necessarily prohibit 
LWI engineers from performing an intervention. As one LWI engineer explained:  
If I cannot find specific information, then I use what is available and can 
conclude that it [the gathered information] is good enough [to perform an 
intervention] (LWI engineer) 
LWI engineers plan an intervention not only to identify as many differences as 
possible, but also to indentify conditions that mean postponing or cancelling the 
planned LWI: 
The reason why we spend so much time searching for previous experience 
is to assess whether it is at all possible to conduct a specific intervention. 
Earlier experience could indicate specific failures that would prohibit us 
from doing an intervention. Rather than discovering this when we are 
onboard the vessel, we find this 1 or 2 months before the operation. For 
instance, recently we discovered that the control system on the x-mas tree 
[equipment installed on the sea floor, cf. Figure 3] was not compatible 
with our equipment. (LWI engineer) 
Working out a profile for the well, then, always involves sifting, sampling and 
simplifying from the (overly) rich, full biography of the well. 
                                                10%Quoted%by%the%industry%magazine,%Teknisk%Ukeblad,%January%2012.%
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5.2. Assembling similarities: patching together a working understanding 
Well interventions are usually performed several years, even decades, after the well 
was drilled and completed. As pointed out, data related to the well accumulate into 
vast data sets. Multiple subsurface disciplines work with specific aspects of a well and 
during distinct phases of well’s lifecycle. Every discipline in the subsea community11 
have specialised information systems and produce data with specific purposes in mind 
but may later be re-used by other disciplines. The reuse of data outside its initial and 
intended context of use is often problematic as there are tacit assumptions about how 
to make sense of the data (“Is a blank a zero or missing data?”, “What kind of 
equipment was used for this measure?”). This collection of specialised information 
systems operated by the subsea community is constantly evolving, mutating, 
integrating, with episodical disruptions far beyond the image of systematically 
organised portfolios of information systems. They consist of numerous, historically 
layered information systems where new components partly extend, partly substitute 
and partly superimpose existing ones. LWI relies heavily on data captured, structured, 
stored and analysed for purposes other than well interventions. A central concern for 
LWI engineers is to assess the reliability of the information they use, including but 
not restricted to the sensor-base data, by comparing and contrasting data: “Forget 
those choke readings, the sensor stopped working months ago” as one production 
engineer pointed out. Well engineers thus have to triangulate information i.e. compare 
information from different sources to assess its. Triangulation is a central activity 
when planning an intervention. It draws on experience: 
I do not have a lot of experience [a person who has three years experience 
as a well engineer] and the scary thing with [name of the system] is that I 
do not necessarily identify mistakes. He [referring to a colleague] can 
identify mistakes because he has worked with wells for 15 years… certain 
mistakes you can identify… you can identify that some things are not 
physically possible... for instance, the diameter of two connected pipes 
cannot be very different…  so some mistakes one can identify, but not all. 
(LWI engineer) 
                                                11%Subsurface%community%consists%of%professionals%from%a%variety%of%disciplines,%e.g.%geophysicists,%geologists,%reservoir%engineers,%well%engineers,%production%engineers%and%process%engineers.%
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Triangulation is an informal activity and its extent varies. When performing 
triangulation, LWI engineers learn about trustworthiness of information sources:  
All of us are aware that information in [name of the system] is not always 
correct. Preferably, it should be double-checked and compared with other 
sources, for instance, [name of the system]. For example, information 
about equipment can be slightly wrong… for instance, the wrong 
diameter…  
While certain systems are deemed ‘unreliable’ and amendable to double-checking, 
other systems are trusted more. As one LWI engineer explains, “even if we are not 
100% sure, we have to trust [name of the system]”.  
As for information sources, certain individuals or roles are trusted more than 
others. For instance, in planning a LWI, one engineer needed the completion reports 
but realised “you have to know the rig [that did the completion], then you can trace 
who was responsible for completion”. Actors engaged daily with the well are 
considered trustworthy: 
If I lack specific information or I feel uncertain about something I call an 
operator [in the platform’s control room]. If there are certain limitations in 
the well, the platform knows about them. So I can talk with an operator 
and ask. They could say for instance that the annulus pressure should not 
be higher than 50bar… and then I know this [i.e. that the information is 
correct] because I have talked to a person who works with that well in the 
platform every day (LWI engineer) 
LWI engineers plan interventions for multiple wells. Over time they learn which 
information source to trust for specific information. In other words, while information 
needs for well interventions vary, key (or trustworthy) information sources remain the 
same and the ways in which information is gathered are similar. Finding the same 
information across several sources is not a problem but an asset as redundancy 
increases reliability of information.  
In short, LWI engineers collaborate intensively with production engineers and 
members of the subsurface community in OGC (“I always call the control room [of 
the platform]”). Collaboration with external vendors and service providers is equally 
important. Onshore LWI engineers have regular meetings with LWI engineers 
onboard the vessels. Equipment vendors are involved in the planning process in order 
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to deliver or manufacture certain equipment, or provide reliable information about the 
exact configuration of the equipment. Close collaboration with vendors is required in 
order to make sure that a vessel is loaded with the correct equipment to perform a 
certain intervention effectively. 
5.3. Punctuation: break-downs and anomalies 
The strategies of LWI practices covered above involve getting the planning off the 
ground in the first place and subsequently making it more robust. Despite a month of 
planning, LWIs experience (small and not so small) anomalies. To facilitate a close 
link between LWI planning and execution, the intervention is always supervised by an 
LWI engineer onboard the vessel. The intervention is performed by representatives of 
the vendors of the subsea well equipment in question also onboard the vessel. Daily 
videoconferences are held between the LWI engineer onboard and those onshore. 
Usually the LWI engineer responsible for the planning of the given intervention is the 
one participating from the onshore end of these videoconferences. 
That anomalies emerge following LWI planning is not surprising. LWI 
engineers work with objects they have hardly examined closely (physically) before. 
Their understandings, as described earlier, rely on vast historic and real-time data, 
consultations with both external partners and OGC colleagues.  Yet accuracy and 
completeness of information of wells varies, thus well interventions inherently 
involve risks.  
Well engineers learn how to cope and improvise with aberrant wells over time. 
During an intervention, for instance, it is crucial to ensure that the equipment 
connected to the vessel is at the right depth. In one engineer’s words, you need to 
know “where you are in the well”. To ensure depth control, well engineers require 
detailed, updated information about the installed pipes. Lack of this information does 
not imply that an intervention cannot be performed:  
If we do not have certain information it means more uncertainty. If we do 
not know the length of pipes and how they are connected, we can do some 
workarounds. We can identify depth in several ways. We could use 
connection locator, which marks where a given pipe begins and were it 
ends. Alternatively, we could measure relative to the formation. So 
usually, we find a way out. (LWI engineer) 
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If depth control uncertainty arises, LWI engineers find alternative, compensating 
strategies to ensure accuracy. More significant anomalies arise, however, where such 
strategies are insufficient. The work-over equipment used to conduct the interventions 
are up to 20 meters in length and difficult to manoeuvre. During an intervention, the 
work-over equipment is manoeuvred via thin cables to the vessel. Well paths (i.e. the 
possibly several kilometres long trajectory of the well from the seabed to the 
reservoir) are hardly straight lines as they bend, even horizontally, to make them S-
shaped. Despite precautions and preparations, incidents happen: 
It happens we drop ‘things’ [equipment] into the well. For instance, we 
can get stuck when we are going in or out of a well. In such case, we try 
to ‘fish’ the equipment up ourselves. However, we have limited 
possibilities from our vessel. If we cannot retrieve the equipment, we 
would, for instance, have to cut 4000 meters of cable plus the equipment 
attached to the cable. (LWI engineer) 
Even ‘straightforward’ cases create dramatic anomalies: 
We made damages to a well during an intervention. We injected liquid 
into the well, but pumped too much, which subsequently increased the 
pressure causing the production tubing to collapse. We had to leave the 
well and a [mobile] rig had to be acquired to fix the well. (LWI engineer) 
Coping with anomalies through learning over time about a specific well is necessary 
but not sufficient. Learning from anomalies across wells is also required. Depending 
on the level and type, an anomaly in one well is made visible in formal documents or 
designated arenas. With smaller anomalies, e.g. onboard LWI engineers relying on 
videoconferencing with onshore resources with knowledge of other wells: 
What do you do when you get stuck in a well? It is important to have 
someone [onshore LWI engineers] to discuss with. In extreme situations, 
offshore [LWI] engineers call the [LWI] engineer on duty who quickly 
assembles a support team. This team informs [governmental] authorities 
about the situations and contributes to offshore decision-making. You [the 
onboard LWI engineer] have to consider so many issues in these 
situations… (LWI engineer) 
The so-called subsea pool is an institutional arena for discussing anomalies. It consists 
of well engineers from about 15 assets each with multiple wells from one 
geographical area of the Norwegian Continental Shelf. In their meetings, they discuss 
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anomalies across wells with similar profile. Coping with such family resemblance of 
anomalies may lead to formalising new checklists or routines. To illustrate, in a 
sequence of meetings, recurring anomalies in multiple wells with the so-called work-
over riser12 were discussed. First, they decided to revise add an item to the existing 
checklist to check the riser specifically. Still not able to cope satisfactory, a later 
meeting decided on a protocol applicable to all wells in the assets for how the “riser 
shall be monitored with respect to fatigue life”.  
6. Discussion 
6.1. Charactering the crafting of similarities 
Our concern is more targeted than observing that there exist relationships between 
work practices. We analyse the specific relationship of similarity: how does similarity 
in work practices get crafted? 
In a study of how Enterprise Systems acquire their similarity – their ability to 
be packaged to serve multiple client organisations – Pollock et al. (2007) argue that it 
is by ‘generification’. Generification is interesting especially methodologically as it 
underscores the presence of arenas and actors more often than not left out in cases of 
Enterprise Systems implementations in a given organisation. The authors demonstrate 
how key actors (e.g. for Enterprise Systems: industry analysts like Gartner group) 
create a level of similarity as they operate across multiple clients. For LWI, the 
external service providers and vendors of subsea equipment in an analogous manner 
contribute towards similarities in LWI work practices. These external vendors serve 
multiple energy companies besides OGC. Their own ongoing efforts towards 
increased standardisation and interoperability of their equipment (with associated 
maintenance routines) rub off also to LWI practices.  
Yamauchi and Swanson (2010) also analyse mechanisms through which 
similarities in technology mediated work practices. They suggest similarities in space 
emerge over time in ‘familiarity pockets’. Due to time-space separation, the learning 
(‘assimilation’) implicated in establishing similar work practices is partial and thus 
limit the repertoire of work practices. Users, when challenged by anomalies or new 
situations, “rather than seek a deeper cognitive understanding…they tend to work 
                                                12%A%riser%is%a%specialised%tool%used%during%LWI.%
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around their ignorance” (ibid., p. 201). In contrast, the strategies we have identified 
for LWI practices definitely aim for ‘deeper’ understanding. What emerges from our 
analysis is an oscillating process. It starts with extracting the biography or 
‘personality’ of the specific well. Document templates provide cues for which sources 
and whom to consult. Next, an implicit form of categorisation of the well is done – 
establishing its family resemblance - by identifying similar aspects with other wells. 
An important and institutionalised vehicle is here the filling in of a 2 x 2 risk matrix 
mapping frequency of incidents against consequences. LWI engineers are not 
concerned about directly comparing wells, only their risk profiles. Finally, there is the 
inevitable handling of anomalies where LWI planning meets the full, operational 
reality. 
Coping with anomalies is not merely about in situ improvisations or 
accumulated learning from a specific well. This would effectively turn anomalies into 
a re-dressed version of practice theory. Crucial to our analysis is how anomalies from 
one well are made visible, thus potentially relevant, to other wells. Local anomalies 
feed an ongoing process of identifying family resemblance of anomalies across wells. 
This takes place through a combination of formal documents and institutionalised 
arenas/ meetings. Responses to anomalies are accordingly not handled (only) there 
and then, but get gradually sedimented into documents, checklists and routines. 
Significant anomalies need to be documented in a given system supervised by the 
National petroleum authority and are subject to nationally regulated audits. Smaller 
anomalies are documented in the Final well report. Patterns of similar anomalies are 
discussed in institutionalised arenas of well engineers from several assets and 
typically result in revised checklists and routines. LWI, especially for complex wells 
(high pressure and/ or temperature, history of incidents), have institutionalised ‘peer 
review’ processes as laid out by Governing documentation. A peer review process 
assembles a team of production and reservoir engineers to review documentation.  
6.2. The pragmatism and politics of family resemblances 
Starting from templates (uniform across space), LWI engineers develop a fragile, 
contingent, definitely fallible ‘working knowledge’ of the well, its personality and 
resemblance with related wells that allow similar enough LWI work practices. As the 
US Government appointed commission following the Deepwater Horizon blow-out in 
the Gulf of Mexico made painfully clear and LWI engineers would subscribe to, 
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“each oil well has its own personality” (2010, p.21). So if full knowledge about the 
local circumstances of a well is not the ambition, when and how do the engineers 
know sufficient for LWI to proceed? We discuss selected aspects. 
LWI for one well never is the same as the next. LWI practices are made to be 
similar enough for ambulatory LWI to take place within technical, practical and 
institutional boundaries. This entails a performative rather than essentialist 
understanding of what similarity is (Orlikowski and Scott 2008). Similarity is not 
identifying certain attributes that all items share as observed by Rosch and Mervis 
(1975, p. 575) in their discussion of Wittgenstein’s (1953) notion of family 
resemblance because “each item has at least one, and probably several, [attributes] in 
common with one or more other items, but no, or few, [attributes] are common to all 
items” (emphasis added).  
Second, the question of similarity becomes a pragmatic one. Pragmatism has 
attracted some interest in IS research13 but scholars have tended to pursue other 
aspects such as conceptual modelling (Ågerfalk, 2010) and action research (Sjöström 
& Goldkuhl, 2009).  “Pragmatics”, notes Giere (2004, p. 742) “has been largely a 
catchall for whatever is left over, but seldom systematically investigated”. Rather than 
a fixed criterion, the crafting of similarity is inherently linked with the intentionality/ 
purpose of the work practice. The directedness of practical activities or in the words 
of Orr (1996, p. 6, emphasis in original), “The first and foremost goal of practice…is 
getting the job done”, pragmatism shares with another crucial underpinning of 
practice theory, viz. phenomenology (Idhe 2001). For instance, in filling in the risk 
matrix for a well as part of the planning, the focus is to categorise the risk profile of 
the well, not capture its biography in full. This risk profile directs the type and extent 
of preparations for the LWI engineers ‘to get the job done’. 
Third, similarities in work practices are learnt over time (Chu and Robey 
2008; Yamauchi and Swanson 2010). However, discussing similarities in work 
practices in terms of ‘learning’ downplays to the level of non-existence political 
aspects of attempting to establish similarities in work practices (Howard-Grenville 
and Carlile 2006). The vocabulary of learning is one purged of conflict. The 
pragmatic issue of similar enough work practices is, as Perin (2004) reminds us, 
caught in political cross-pressure from concerns of efficiency, safety and professional 
                                                13%See%AIS%Special%Interest%Group%on%Pragmatist%IS%Research%(SIGPrag),%http://www.sigprag.org/%
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identity thus challenging the more harmonious, learning-oriented portray of e.g. high-
reliability organisations (HRO) (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). A vivid illustration of 
how safety is tied to concerns for similarities in work practices is the gas leakage 
problems OGC experienced at one of its fields in 2010. In the Governmental audit 
conducted after the incidents and subsequent shutdown, the main conclusion was that 
a disaster in the magnitude of Deepwater Horizon could have happened “under 
marginally different circumstances”14. The thrust of the audit’s critique was OGC’s 
apparently lacking ability to establish similar work practices for planning, production 
and maintenance across is oil and gas fields, including OGC’s lacking ability to draw 
out the relevant similarities in wells separated in time and space. National petroleum 
authorities and OGC management want to move away from the traditional, local work 
practices to establish stronger similarities across space and time. In short, the ongoing 
efforts to establish more similar work practices across space-time is not only about 
‘learning from experience’ – nobody opposes that – but a highly political issue 
involving the unions and management of OGC in addition to being framed within a 
national and international institutional and regulatory regime. 
7. Conclusion 
In the context of processes of globalisation, Appadurai (1996) makes the observation 
that theorising lags significantly behind the empirically, unfolding phenomenon. This 
is not unlike the situation we are analysing. Business and public organisations have 
invested heavily to establish distributed yet uniform work practices, e.g. by 
introducing Enterprise Systems. As practice-based research makes clear, achieving 
identical (‘best’) work practices is unattainable. Still, had not managers, owners and 
investors after two decades of Enterprise Systems also recognised an interesting level 
of similarities in work practices, surely they would have fallen out of fashion? It 
seems to us that the unfolding, empirical phenomenon of technologically mediated 
efforts to promote similar work practices has yet to receive an adequate theoretical 
account in information systems research.  
In our use the notion of family resemblance is performative, pragmatic and 
political. Resonating with Wittgenstein’s (1953) original insights, family resemblance 
of work practices is not about sharing certain attributes. Similarity is performed or 
                                                14%www.ptil.no,%the%Petroleum%Safety%Authorities,%Norway.%
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crafted through the strategies we have discussed. The criterion for when sufficient 
similarity is achieved is pragmatic in the sense of directed or intentional. The filling in 
of a 2 x 2 risk matrix directs attention to those similarities that matter for the planning 
of the LWI (e.g. type of equipment to bring along). Moreover, the crafting of 
similarity is political. This is especially evident around issues of safety and risk. 
Whether compliance to uniform work practices improves safety, or whether safe 
operations and maintenance are better served by practices shaped by the local 
circumstances of the well, is discussed heatedly between OGC management and 
unions as well as national authorities.  
Family resemblance of work practices is relevant to many organisations for 
reasons of economic performance, quality of service and safety to human life and the 
environment. A key practical implication from our study is that the crafting of family 
resemblance is ongoing and emergent rather than about nailing the exact balance 
between uniformity and localised work practices. More specifically, our study show 
the importance of flexibly stepping up the degree of formalism and amount of 
resources in response to number, frequency and type of anomaly. As anomalies 
increase in gravity, so do the number of people, amount of time spent, format for 
deliberation/ arena and degree of formal documentation. Rather than a fixed, 
institutional response, a dynamically modulated response relative to the gravity of the 
anomalies is required. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of subsea equipment operated by a vessel (left) and a subsea 
wellhead (right). 
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Figure 2. Illustrations of corrosion in of a well’s tubing.  
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
Figure 3. Illustrations of key subsea components:  manifold (left), control module 
(middle) and x-mas tree (right). 
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Figure 4. Readings (left) from the pressure sensor (right) in the form of a histogram 
over time. 
 
 
 
Actor group/ department Number of interviews 
IT-managers and developers 14 
Research & Development department (R&D) 23 
Oil and Gas Production (OGP) 22 
Light well intervention (LWI) department 9 
Total number of interviews 68 
 
Table 1. Overview over type and number of interview informants. 
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Construct Conceptual category Excerpt  
Differentiation Biography “Every well is unique”  
“You need to know the personality 
of the well” 
“If you didn’t follow the well from 
its inception, there is no way you 
know where to find the information 
[about the well]” 
Configuration “There is no plug & play 
possibilities [across vendors of 
subsea equipment]” 
“The technical complexity of subsea 
equipment is challenging” 
“I call the vendor for technical 
details [of equipment]” 
Assembling similarities Triangulate “Information in [name of system] 
[need to be] compared with other 
sources, e.g. [name of system]” 
“[those] sensors stopped working 
months ago” 
Trust “He [referring to a collegue] can 
identify mistakes because he has 
worked with wells for 15 years” 
“If I lack specific information…I 
call an operator [at the platform’s 
control room]” 
  36 
Punctuation Uncertainty “If I…feel uncertain…[about] 
certain limitations in the well, the 
platform [operator] will know more 
about these” 
The Safe Job Assessment requires 
filling in the 2 x 2 risk matrix, 
plotting frequency of incidents 
against consequences.  
“If we do not know the length of the 
pipes and how they are connected, 
we can do some workarounds” 
Unplanned events “Recently we discovered that the 
control system of the x-mas tree [cf. 
Figure 2] was not compatible with 
our equipment” 
“It happens we drop ‘things’ 
[equipment] into the well” 
“We injected liquid into the well, 
but pumped too much…causing the 
production tubing to collapse” 
 
Table 2. Interpretative constructs, conceptual categories and excerpts underpinning 
our data analysis.  
 
